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Abstract 
 
The article provides a synthetic account of the historical development of London’s water 
supply system within its wider national context, and addresses the current organisational 
setting of the water sector. Particular attention is paid to the post-Second World War 
period, which marked a transition towards integrated water management in England and 
Wales, a trend that has been consolidated since the 1970s. The paper emphasises the 
continuities and contradictions arising from the different combinations of public and 
private management strategies characterising the UK water sector, and their implications 
for the sustainable management of water resources. It argues that there exists an in-built 
contradiction in the current institutional framework between the profit-oriented rationale 
of the private operators and the goals of efficiency, equity, and environmental 
sustainability pursued by the water regulators. Within this framework, it highlights the 
key policy issues facing the metropolitan water systems, and suggests what their most 
likely trajectories might be in the foreseeable future. 
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1. Introduction 
In this article we explore the regularities and cycles characterising water management in 
England and Wales, with especial focus on the contradictions arising from the different 
combinations of public and private sector participation in the field and in the case of 
London in particular. We argue that there exists an in-built contradiction in the current 
institutional setting of the water industry, which was institutionalised in 1989 with the 
privatisation of the then existing ten regional water supply and sewage disposal 
authorities in England and Wales.1 This contradiction arises from the opposing interests 
embodied, on one side, in the profit-oriented rationale of the private operators and, on 
the other, in the goals of efficiency, equity and environmental sustainability – often also 
mutually contradictory – which constitute the mandate of the water regulators. We 
highlight key policy issues arising from this contradiction, and suggest some of the most 
likely trajectories for the water sector in the foreseeable future. 
In addressing this subject, we provide a synthetic account of the historical 
development of London’s water institutions, with particular reference to the post-Second 
World War period, within the wider context of transition towards integrated water 
management in England and Wales. This trend was consolidated through successive 
institutional and political rearrangements that took place since the early 1970s. The 
intricacies of these reforms and of the eventual privatisation of 1989 cannot yet be 
entirely elucidated, as the processes set in motion are still unfolding and are subject to 
close scrutiny and public debate. Among other issues, this debate reflects the persistence 
of a long-standing tradition in the UK, where water supply services have developed 
from both private and public initiatives and the institutional evolution of the sector has 
been shaped by the social and political struggles arising from the contradictions between 
the defense of private rights and the protection of the public good. The internal tensions 
created by these contradictory forces are still at work, perhaps even more than ever 
before and, unsurprisingly, the restructuring of the sector continues. 
 
2. The evolution of the institutional configuration 
The foundations of the modern organisational framework for the London water sector 
have been laid since the 1840s, fuelled by the need for regulating a fast growing industry 
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 This only refers to England and Wales, as Scotland and Northern Ireland have followed a different path 
and these services continue to be in public hands. 
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in the face of increasing concerns about water-related public health scares and social 
equality. These efforts were directed at establishing some degree of public control over 
the eight private companies that supplied water to the metropolis, while wastewater and 
river basin management were also becoming crucial policy considerations. The 
convergence of growing population, accelerated decomposition of the tidal Thames 
owing to the increasing pollution, and expanded abstractions from the river without 
adequate treatment prompted a major reorganisation of the water sector in this period 
(Metropolitan Water Board, 1949). 
Since the late eighteenth century, the prevailing laissez faire economic 
environment underpinned the adoption of free competition between private water 
undertakers as the model for the provision of water supply in the metropolis. However, 
the laissez-faire approach failed to deliver the expected results, which eventually led to 
the enforcement of stricter regulation aimed at establishing a minimum degree of social 
equity (especially by expanding coverage and limiting profits), and raising the quality of 
the services. In particular, water quality and health concerns, which had been the object 
of political debate since the 1820s, came to occupy a central stage during the 1840s, not 
least owing to the 1848-49 Cholera epidemics that were partly blamed on the reluctance 
of most private operators to invest in adequate treatment systems (Sisley, 1899; Finer, 
1997; Ward, 1997). 
The changing policy environment became embodied in a series of Acts of 
Parliament that had important consequences for the organization of the sector, initiating 
a trend towards the concentration of the water services in public hands. The Waterworks 
Acts passed in 1847 set up a code of practice including financial and technical 
standards, while the 1848 Sewers Act marked the birth of water-borne waste disposal, 
which would have unforeseen consequences for the river Thames. A main landmark in 
this process was the 1852 Metropolitan Water Act, which ordered the private water 
companies serving the city to move their water intakes westwards, well above the tidal 
section of the River Thames where the city sewers discharged. Since then, the majority 
of London’s treatment works were placed on the fringes of the capital and supplies to 
the major demand centres were maintained by pumping through a network of large 
diameter trunk mains radiating from the treatment centres across London (Metropolitan 
Water Board, 1949, 1954). However, the single most important advance towards a 
unified water management approach was the creation in 1855 of the Metropolitan Board 
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of Works (MBW), prompted by the need to tackle the mounting pollution in the river 
Thames. Its main task, the construction of an interceptor sewer system, was completed 
by 1865 (Antonelli, 1992). This trend was consolidated by successive reports by the 
Select Committee on East London Water Bills, the Operation of the Metropolis Water 
Act (1867), the Royal Commission on Water Supply (1869), and the creation of the 
Local Government Board (LGB) in 1871, which assumed the task of overseeing the 
water companies (Mukhopadhyay, 1975). 
Despite these attempts to increase control and supervision over water services, in 
practice the water status quo was maintained for several decades. To a large extent, this 
happened because water policies became intertwined with the political battles over the 
metropolis’ form of government that ran through the 1870s to the 1890s 
(Mukhopadhyay, 1975). This development took place within the wider context of 
political transformation at the national level, represented by the expansion of franchise 
through the Reform Acts and the municipalisation of public services – ‘gas and water 
socialism’ (Taylor, 1999; Hassan, 1998; Laski et. al., 1935; Millward, 1991). 
Eventually, the 1900 report prepared by the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Water 
Supply laid the basis for the definitive take over of the water companies by the 
government. In 1902, the public ownership of London’s water supply was established 
with the creation of the Metropolitan Water Board (MWB), which led to the 
amalgamation of the eight water companies under the control of a joint board of local 
authorities (Metropolitan Water Board, 1949). 
To a large extent, the main pattern of the water systems serving London today 
was inherited from the developments that took place in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Moreover, the evolution of the water institutions provided London with its first 
metropolitan municipal bodies, as water flows – both clean and, especially, dirty – were 
instrumental in the slow process of political and administrative articulation of the city, 
which is still an incomplete process. Perhaps, the most important achievement of this 
period was the widespread acceptance – across the political spectrum – that the 
provision of safe water services was a binding moral duty which could not be entrusted 
to the unregulated free play of the market forces (Luckin, 1986). 
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2.1. The politics of water management integration 
The centralisation of water activities in the metropolis was embedded in the wider 
process of integration of the water sector at the national level. The campaigns for 
improving the nation-wide co-ordination of water management activities started as early 
as the late nineteenth century, and several failed attempts were made during the early 
twentieth century (Okun, 1977). The subject received renewed attention with the 
creation of the Central Advisory Water Committee (CAWC) in 1937, which would play 
an important role in the institutional transformations of the subsequent period. In 
particular, the CWAC’s Third Report of 1943 (the Milne Report) recommended the 
creation of river authorities in charge of pollution control, water conservation and river 
monitoring. The Report became the basis of the 1944 White Paper on “A National 
Water Policy”, which suggested that the Ministry of Health should be given 
responsibility for central planning and water conservation, recommendations that were 
incorporated in the 1945 Water Act and in the 1948 Rivers Boards Act that created 32 
river boards in England and Wales (Parker et. al., 1980). 
The institutional transformations of this period marked the transition towards a 
new model of organisation of the water sector in the context of the post-war Keynesian 
welfare state, which was characterised by central control, rational planning, the 
increasing reliance on scientific expertise in the management of public affairs, and the 
pursuit of the common good in the search of greater social equality (Titmuss, 1956; 
Marshall, 1992; Clarke et al. 1997). In the water sector, this gave way to a ‘managerial’ 
water management model that sought to achieve greater control over the water cycle, 
provide a continuous wholesome water supply, and expand water and sanitation services 
to the whole population through cross subsidisation (Taylor, 1999).  
These events led to significant advances and, by the late 1960s, England and 
Wales had achieved the formal integration of water supply and wastewater systems and 
the consolidation of the integrated watershed management model, while the services 
were extended to provide almost complete coverage to the urban and rural population. 
Also, the increasing water demand brought about by higher living standards and 
expanded consumption prompted the development of water research activities, in 
particular to forecast demand and identify new resources. In 1957, private initiatives 
created the Water Research Association, while two years later the public sector set up a 
Sub-Committee on Growing Demand for Water within the CAWC in response to the 
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serious drought of 1959 and amid calls for the further integration of water management 
activities. These initiatives marked the new spirit of the time and underscored the 
developments that led to the 1963 Water Resources Act, which gave further authority to 
the River Boards, renamed them as River Authorities (RAs), and created the Water 
Resources Board (WRB) as the central water research agency (Okun, 1977; Parker et al. 
1980). However, and despite the progress achieved, the actual establishment of a 
national framework for integrated water management had to wait until the 1970s. 
In the metropolis, after the unification of the water companies in public hands 
the next step was the integration of the Greater London water supply, where twelve 
municipal and commercial operators ran the service. Although this was partly achieved 
during the Second World War, when the War Emergency Water Committee established 
a de facto co-ordination of water activities across the Thames watershed, the attempt to 
institutionalise integrated basin-wide management beyond the war emergency period 
was strongly opposed by an important number of local authorities and by most of the 
sixty-five water undertakers that shared the watershed (Mukhopadhyay, 1975). The 
creation of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1965 renewed the interest in 
centralising water management in the basin, but this would not be achieved until the 
1974 national reorganisation of the water sector, when the MBW was abolished and the 
responsibility for water management in the Thames basin was transferred to the Thames 
Water Authority (TWA) (Mukhopadhyay, 1975; Okun, 1977). 
 
2.2. The 1974 reorganisation: the politics of ‘apolitical’ water management 
In 1969, the Institution of Water Engineers produced a report that constituted the first 
explicit proposal for what shortly after would become one the most radical 
transformations of the sector: the removal of local authorities from water management 
activities. In 1971, the CWAC produced another report suggesting the creation of a few 
Regional Water Authorities throughout the country, which would be in charge of the 
whole water management complex. Despite the clear political implications of these 
events, it has been argued that water issues were largely outside the party political arena 
during this period, not least because water management was perceived as an apolitical 
cross-party issue, with exception of ownership of water and the operation of private 
undertakings (Maloney et al., 1995).  
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The subsequent reorganisation of the water sector was closely related to the 
radical transformation of local government and the health sector in England and Wales, 
which took place through the Local Government Act of 1972 and reduced the number of 
local authorities from 1424 to 456 starting on 1 April 1974.2 The simultaneous 
reorganisation of the water sector, implemented though the 1973 Water Act, resulted in 
the creation of ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) in England and Wales, which 
replaced 29 river authorities, 160 water supply undertakings managed by local 
authorities and joint boards, and about 1300 sewage treatment and disposal units. The 
RWAs became responsible for water resources and supply, sewerage and sewage 
disposal, prevention of pollution, cleaning up of the country’s rivers and estuaries, 
protection and development of salmon and freshwater fisheries, the recreation and 
amenity use of the water space, and, in some cases, for navigation (Okun, 1977). 
The reorganisation was severely criticised, especially because the scope of the 
rationalisation was limited, arguably owing to the political pressures exerted on the 
government by powerful lobbies. For instance, the RWAs were given only a supervisory 
role for land drainage and flood protection, which remained under the control of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and local authorities, and this was 
allegedly the result of powerful lobbying of the government by rural interests (Parker et 
al., 1980). Also, although the creation of the RWAs was aimed at replacing the highly 
disintegrated water sector composed of hundreds of small water and sewerage 
undertakers, 31 statutory private water supply companies that together served about 25 
per cent of the population were allowed to coexist alongside the RWAs. The critics 
pointed at the inconsequent character of the policy that took away water services from 
the local authorities with the argument that the public would be better served by large-
scale, watershed-wide, water undertakings, but retained the small statutory water 
companies. They argued that the policy implemented was a discrimination against local 
governments, and a massive reduction of democratic accountability in the provision of 
the services. In London, they carried this criticism even further, as they felt that the 
government’s argument failed to explain the abolition of the MWB and the stripping of 
the GLC’s sewerage functions (Maloney et al. 1995). 
                                                 
2
 London was an exception because the local government system had been already reformed in 1964/65 
with the creation of the Greater London Council. 
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2.2.1. The institutionalization of river basin management 
The creation of the Thames Water Authority (TWA) extended London’s political 
influence on water issues to the whole Thames watershed, as the TWA absorbed 10 
water undertakings and 163 wastewater operators. This, and the fact that it was the 
largest of the ten RWAs, serving a population of about 12.1 million – almost 25 per cent 
of the total population of England and Wales – gave the TWA a central role in the 
reorganisation process (Okun, 1977). The TWA also inherited a well-established 
tradition of sound water management and a well-developed – although ageing – 
infrastructure, which was reflected in lower charges and lower increases to charges than 
the other RWAs. This was an important issue, as water supply charges followed a rising 
trend in England and Wales through the 1970s owing to the prevailing situation of high 
inflation rates, recession, and high interest rates, accumulating an average increase of 97 
per cent between 1974 and 1979 (Parker et. al., 1980). 
The 1974 reorganisation has been described as a process of integration, 
delocalisation, and managerialisation of water services, which over time concentrated 
water control in the hands of the central government (Parker et. al., 1980). It took away, 
at least formally, water management activities from the hands of local authorities, whose 
influence on water policy was further curtailed by additional reforms implemented in the 
1983 Water Act. These measures significantly reduced the public accountability of 
water management activities, which increasingly became the preserve of a techno-
scientific and managerial elite. However, the new management structures greatly 
facilitated decision-making processes and fostered the rationalisation of distribution 
networks and resource planning. The advantages of the new model were eventually 
demonstrated during the 1975-1976 drought, when it was widely recognised that the 
RWAs were better prepared to respond to the emergency than the previous bodies, given 
their capacity to co-ordinate efforts at the watershed level (Reed, 1977; Freeman, 
1977a). 
 
2.2.2. The challenge of pollution control: ‘dirty water’ politics 
Perhaps where the political character of the process became more transparent was in 
relation to pollution control. Thus, although the creation of the RWAs represented an 
important step towards the integrated management of the water cycle, in practice the 
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‘brown agenda’ remained relatively marginal owing mainly to political considerations. 
This sphere of activity had also been the subject of long-standing contradictions, 
characterised by the historical imbalance between water and sewage policies. According 
to some critics, for a long time dirty-water politics were characterised by “the staying 
power of secrecy”, as consents granted for effluent discharges were kept secret and 
offenders – often well-known industries and public bodies – were sheltered from 
exposure and shame (Kinnersley, 1989). Also, although the 1963 Water Resources Act 
had introduced a system of fee-paid licenses for water abstractions, wastewater 
discharge consents continued to be free of charge (Okun, 1997; Parker et al., 1980). 
In this regard, the 1974 restructuring did not introduce significant changes to the 
system. Although a public register of fee-paid discharge consents was formally 
introduced, in practice these measures were not enforced until the late 1980s, largely 
owing to the lack of independence of the RWAs – whose membership was composed of 
major polluters – and to the economic recession that hit the country during the 1970s. 
Unsurprisingly, for some critics the 1974 reorganisation was a sort of “administrative 
fix” that in practice allowed the maintenance of the status quo, supported by influential 
social actors, who had vested interests in slowing down any real improvements in 
environmental control policies, in particular private dischargers, farmers and factories, 
and urban centres (Kinnersley, 1989). 
 
2.2.2.1. Pollution control in the metropolis: a public sector achievement  
London, in this respect, followed a different path owing to a long-standing concern with 
the health of the river Thames dating back to the nineteenth century (Thames 
Conservancy, 1957). Since the 1950s, the Port of London Authority, the Middlesex 
County Council, and the London County Council had been pressing for new powers to 
tackle pollution in the river, leading to the creation in 1951 of a Governmental 
Committee entrusted with examining the effects of pollutant discharges into the tidal 
Thames. In 1964, the GLC initiated a phased programme of investments to carry out 
major improvements in the sewage works at Beckton and Crossness, which was taken 
over by the TWA in 1974. As a result of the combined action of these public bodies, by 
the late 1970s the tidal Thames was clean, with more than 90 varieties of fish returning 
to its waters (Freeman, 1977). 
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Also, wider environmental issues, as reflected in EC directives and other 
legislation, had a major impact on the working of the TWA (Kenny et al., 1980; Walker, 
1983). In particular, the TWA had traditionally disposed of large quantities of sludge to 
the sea in the Thames estuary, a practice that had been started in 1889 (Whitelaw et al., 
1988). The authority had to tighten control of trade effluent in the treatment plants at 
Beckton and Crossness, following the Government’s ratification of the Oslo and London 
conventions. Moreover, there was increasing pressure from other countries to stop the 
disposal of sewage sludge to the sea, although this practice would not be discontinued 
until 1998. 
 
2.3. The 1989 privatisation: continuities and contradictions 
Seen in perspective, the process of integration, delocalisation, and managerialisation of 
water services brought about by the 1974 reorganisation created the conditions for the 
next stage, the full privatisation of the sector. On the one hand, the formal integration of 
water and wastewater activities and the regionalisation of management were assumed as 
preconditions to achieve greater efficiency in a context where the water sector had been 
already redefined as a primarily scientific, technical and technological endeavour 
(Parker et al., 1980). On the other hand, the shift in the power balance created by freeing 
water management from the control of local authorities, especially after the 1983 Water 
Act, and increasingly placing it in the hands of the central government and business 
interests significantly limited the scope for participation and democratic control 
(Maloney et al., 1995). 
With privatisation, all functions related to water supply and sewerage were 
transferred to ten Water Service Companies (WSCs), which replaced the RWAs starting 
on 1 September 1989 (Figure 1). Other duties previously in the hands of the RWAs, like 
pollution control, water resource management, fisheries, flood protection and alleviation 
and land drainage, were entrusted to a newly created public body, the National Rivers 
Authority (NRA) (WSA, 1995). The only exception were 29 Statutory Water 
Companies, which had survived the 1974 reorganisation and now were also allowed to 
continue with some changes to their status as Water only Companies (WoCs). The 
WSCs were set up as the principal operating subsidiaries of the ten Water Holding 
Companies (WHCs), the plcs established under the 1989 Companies Act. The regulatory 
framework established for the provision of water and sewerage services only applied to 
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the WSC section of the WHCs, while other activities of the water groups not directly 
connected with water and sewerage were left unregulated. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 around here> 
 
The main innovations introduced by privatisation were: 1) in the water supply 
sector, the private companies became subject to a new type of monopoly price control, 
2) for the first time, sewerage and sewage disposal were turned into private businesses, 
and 3) the establishment of an independent body for pollution control. The development 
of the policy and legislative framework and the appointments of companies to act as 
water and sewerage undertakers and of the relevant regulatory bodies became the 
responsibility of the Secretaries of State for the Environment and for Wales. The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) retained responsibilities 
concerning flood defences and fisheries, and the licensing, monitoring and control of 
effluent and other discharges into the sea. The Director General of the Office of Water 
Services (OFWAT), the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), and the NRA were 
established as the main regulators in the sector, while other bodies like the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (MCC), the HM Inspectorate of Pollution, District Health 
Authorities, and local authorities also retained an overseeing role on particular issues 
(WSA, 1995). In 1995 the role of environmental regulator was entrusted to the 
Environment Agency (EA), which was created by amalgamating the NRA, Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), 83 Waste Regulation Authorities (WRAs), 
and parts of the Department of the Environment. Its main functions are prevention and 
control of pollution by setting limits for the discharge of dangerous substances, 
establishing discharge consents for sewage treatment works, controlling the spreading of 
sewage sludge on agricultural land, setting minimum flows for rivers, and issuing water 
abstraction licenses. It also oversees fisheries, water recreation, conservation and 
navigation. 
 
2.3.1. The current organisation of water services in the metropolitan area 
The appointed WSC in the metropolitan area is Thames Water Utilities Ltd. Thames 
Water’s supply area includes London and a large proportion of central southern England 
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(Figure 2). The average daily amount of water supplied by Thames Water in 2001 was 
2,090 million liters in the whole watershed to an estimated population of over 7.8 
million people (OFWAT, 2001). The WHC, Thames Water Plc, had a turnover of £1.39 
billion in 1998, 74.1 per cent of which was derived from the UK water operation, while 
the rest was composed by international operations (12.4 per cent) and other activities 
(13.5 per cent). 
 
<Insert Figure 2 around here> 
 
However, as mentioned before, an important share of the metropolitan 
population continues to be served by Water only Companies (WoCs). These statutory 
and privately owned ventures have existed since the nineteenth century and continue to 
provide their service alongside the WSCs. In 2001, parts of London were served by two 
smaller WoCs, Sutton and East Surrey and Three Valleys Water, which also cover part 
of the surrounding non-metropolitan areas (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The metropolitan water sector (2001) 
Company Water Supply 
     Population             Area (Km²)     
Million 
Liters/day 
Thames Water 7,851,800 8,200 2,090 
Sutton & East Surrey         637,300 833 138 
Three Valleys 2,933,100 3,213 738 
Source: Elaborated from OFWAT (2001) 
 
Table 1 reflects the results of the industry’s consolidation since the mid 1990s, 
when London was still served by four small WoCs, in addition to Thames Water. Since 
privatisation there have been substantial changes in ownership among WSCs and WoCs 
alike (OFWAT, 2000b, 2000c), as southern England became a target for foreign 
investors. Thames Water itself, being the largest of the WSCs, became surrounded by 
aggressive world-class competitors such as the French groups Vivendi and Saur, and 
was eventually taken over by the German multiutility RWE in September 2000. 
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2.3.2. Evolution, not revolution 
There is still much debate about the real objectives and achievements of the 1989 
privatisation of the water industry. Officially, the Conservative administration set five 
main objectives: 1) promoting competition and enterprise, 2) reducing the size of the 
public sector, 3) involving staff in companies, 4) spreading share ownership, and 5) 
freeing enterprise from state controls. There is a consensus, however, that the fifth point 
has been, perhaps, the most important driver of privatisation. Especially, it was expected 
that it would help to solve the chronic underfunding of the water sector, which was 
perceived as a major obstacle for the much needed upgrading of the systems after 
decades of underinvestment and the need to comply with the tighter environmental and 
quality regulations driven by the EC directives. 
In this regard, it is difficult to measure the degree of improvement that 
privatisation has meant for water services in the metropolitan area. At the time that 
privatisation was carried out, the TWA had already achieved high service standards and 
developed a sound system for integrated watershed management (Gardiner, 1988). 
Actually, the management board of the Thames Water Authority (TWA) was 
instrumental in promoting and implementing the privatisation process, which they saw 
as an opportunity to transform a well-managed and well-resourced public company into 
a profit-making private undertaking (Maloney et al., 1995). 
Also, if we consider the most significant achievements listed by Thames Water 
plc (TW) concerning its recent performance – i.e., the cleaning of the river Thames, the 
construction of the London Ring Main, and the North London Artificial Recharge in the 
Lee river basin (Connarton, 1999) – we find that all of them had been originally 
designed before privatisation (Perera et al., 1985; Kean et al., 1988), and some were 
largely completed by the late 1970s, like the cleaning of the Thames (Freeman, 1977). 
The North London Artificial Recharge Scheme replicates an old project dating back to 
1905, partially implemented by the Lee Conservancy Board between 1953 and 1970, 
and later also explored by the Thames Water Authority between 1975 and 1984. The 
scheme, which can deliver up to 155 Ml/d, uses the chalk aquifer in the Enfield-
Haringey area to pump in excess treated water during periods of low demand, and as a 
reservoir from which water can be extracted when it is needed for distribution. 
The London Ring Main is a gravity-fed system for transferring water from 
treatment works to major distribution centres around London, and was started in 1971 
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with the construction of the 19km tunnel between Ashford Common in the Thames 
Valley and Merton Abbey (Protheroe et al., 1979). The ring tunnel was finally 
completed in 1994 by the privatised Thames Water, nearly two years ahead of the 
original schedule. It is 83 km long with a diameter of 2.54 m, runs on average 40 meters 
below the city, and rather than a ring shape it has a trapezoidal outline (Figure 3). The 
system has a capacity of 1,300 million liters, about half the city’s daily consumption at 
the time of its inauguration in 1994. 
On the down side, Thames Water also inherited an ageing trunk and distribution 
system deteriorated by the long-standing underinvestment in infrastructure that 
privatisation was expected to reverse. In the first ten years since privatisation (1989-99), 
Thames Water relined about 10% of the main trunks and renewed 414 km (of a total of 
3,232 km). With the inauguration of the London Water Ring Main in 1994, Thames 
Water expected that leakage levels would be significantly reduced as the new system 
would release pressure from the old trunk mains. However, this has not happened and 
the areas served by Thames Water still have well above average losses, which at their 
peak (1996-97) accounted for over 30% of water put into supply. Although figures for 
1997-99 suggested that important improvements were made, Thames Water is still a 
poor performer in terms of leakage standards and this has become a major bone of 
contention between the company and the regulators (OFWAT, 2001). 
In this connection, the government and the regulators have been placing the 
emphasis on efficiency improvements, especially in the application of demand 
management tools (metering, leakage reduction, etc.) to achieve a sound water balance. 
Regarding metering, the UK has a long-standing tradition of unmetered water supply 
(only about 14% of households have a water meter), which has proved to be very 
resistant to change. Thus, although targeted metering (e.g., metering all new connections 
and large-scale consumers) is being applied, universal metering is considered to be both 
socially unacceptable and uneconomic. The discretionary powers to implement 
compulsory metering for domestic connections conceded to the water operators at 
privatisation has been now limited by new legislation passed in 1999, and most 
companies, including Thames Water plc, do not have metering domestic users among 
their priorities. 
Regarding leakage, Thames Water argues that further reduction of leakage is 
economically unviable and their main priority is the development of new resources. 
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Within the framework of the post-1995 drought water policies (Bakker, 2000), the 
company has adopted a three-stage plan for the period 2000-25. The first stage (2000-
02) includes short-term objectives like the recommissioning of disused groundwater 
sources; the second stage (2002-15) contemplates further recommissioning of disused 
groundwater sources, small-scale groundwater developments, and the extension of water 
reuse programmes; and, the third stage (2014-25) is based in the development of a major 
new resource, the Upper Thames Reservoir, a 14-square km project in South 
Oxfordshire, which may be ready by the year 2015 (Connarton, 1999). However, the 
plan is facing the opposition of the water regulators, environmental organisations, and 
other political actors that have consistently opposed the construction of new reservoirs 
and have been pressing the industry to improve its efficiency, especially concerning 
leakage reduction and the implementation of demand management alternatives. 
To a large extent, the above considerations allow us to conclude that the pursuit 
of the fifth objective of privatisation has produced mixed results. In fact, the degree of 
state involvement in the sector continues to be one of the crucial areas where the internal 
contradictions of the water industry in England and Wales are more apparent. In fact, the 
opposition between the main goals of the private operators (i.e., achieving further 
freedom from state controls and securing profits) and the mandate of the industry’s 
regulators (i.e., promoting efficiency; ensuring the economic viability of the industry; 
protecting consumers; protecting the environment) has been sharpened and deepened by 
recent events, bringing the water sector to what some analysts have termed the 
“efficiency frontier” (Vass, 2001). Crossing the “frontier” is leading towards the partial 
reorganisation of the water industry by reshaping once again the roles of the state and 
the private sector. 
 
2.3.3. Tightening regulation and reshaping the public/private divide   
Much debate has been provoked by the fifth objective of privatisation – freeing the 
water companies from state control – which is also related to the second objective of 
“reducing the size of the public sector”. In fact, the state has developed an 
unprecedented regulatory apparatus, making the privatised water sector subject to a high 
degree of control. The already comprehensive regulatory framework was further 
tightened after the 1995 drought that exposed both the inefficiency of some of the water 
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operators (Bakker, 2000) and the acute problems facing the water sector to internalise 
the social and environmental dimensions of water management (Swyngedouw et. al., 
2002). In particular, the post-1995 intervention of the economic regulator OFWAT was 
driven by the perceived need for limiting the profits made by the private companies, and 
enforcing compliance with investment targets (which had not been met). 
The Water Summit held by the New Labour administration in 1997 further 
intensified the pressure for tighter public control of the private water sector, trying to re-
establish social equity (e.g., by imposing a windfall tax on the water companies and 
banning disconnections of the water supply owing to unpaid bills), and promoting 
greater efficiency (e.g., forcing the private companies to develop mid- and long-term 
plans to cope both with environmental risks, such as the predicted impact of climate 
change on water resources) to deal with evolving societal needs and preferences (DETR, 
1999, 1998 a-d). In addition, OFWAT adopted a tighter stance in the 1999 revision of 
the tariff system and levels (carried out every five years), which ordered a reduction in 
prices for all companies (OFWAT, 1999a-e). 
It can be argued that the tightening of the regulatory framework that followed the 
1995 drought and, particularly the 1997 Water Summit, has helped to make more 
transparent what we called earlier the in-built contradiction of the current organisation 
setting of the water sector in England and Wales. Also, there are already unambiguous 
signals suggesting that the policies adopted might lead to significant changes in the 
current organisation of the industry, which, to some extent, would reshape once again 
the public/private divide in water policy. 
In this connection, another crucial driver of institutional change is the impact of 
competition, which has been very limited due the monopoly and highly regulated 
characteristics of the sector. The main tool has been the incorporation of yardstick 
competition, where the regulator fixes prices based on costs across the country 
providing an incentive to reduce costs below the average level to achieve higher profits. 
Some authors have argued that despite the lack of competition “within” the market 
owing to the monopoly characteristics of the service, there has been intense competition 
“for” the market, which would be providing incentives for greater efficiency (Vass, 
2001; OFWAT, 2000a). In this regard, until 1994 no single individual or company could 
control more than 15 per cent of the WSC shareholdings, while the government retained 
an absolute veto over the activities of the privatised utilities. The protection was levied 
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in December 1994, and there has been a wave of take-overs and mergers, especially 
boosted by foreign investors, and the consolidation of multi-utility conglomerates, with 
different combinations of water, electricity, waste management, gas, and related 
services. However, while in gas, electricity and telecommunications competition has 
helped to improve services and cut down tariffs, water prices have been substantially 
increased since privatisation while performance has been uneven and investment has 
been lagging behind. For these reasons, in the last price review (1999) the regulator set a 
reduction in tariffs and new investment targets, which has prompted a negative reaction 
of the industry. 
In particular, the companies reacted to the 1999 reduction of prices and, 
consequently, of expected profits, by cutting down investment programmes, reducing 
staff numbers, and searching for alternative management models. At least two of the ten 
water and sewerage companies presented plans for partial or even total mutualisation 
and turning their activity into a non-for-profit operation. This was first proposed by the 
Kelda Group (that controls Yorkshire Water), but OFWAT rejected the application 
mainly on technical grounds (OFWAT, 2000d). A not too dissimilar proposal by Welsh 
Water (Glas Cymru) had a very different outcome, and the mutualisation plan was 
approved by OFWAT in July 2001 (OFWAT, 2001b). The Welsh case represents the 
first serious departure from the model institutionalised in 1989 with the full privatisation 
of the water industry. However, it seems clear that the Welsh case was also driven by 
political considerations, in the context of partial devolution of political power to the 
National Assembly for Wales by the New Labour administration, which created the 
conditions for a sort of “deprivatisation without renationalisation” of the water company 
(Vass, 2001). 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Although in the short-term it is unlikely that overall substantial changes will be made to 
the current model based on the private ownership of the water companies in England, it 
is possible now to envisage the potential for significant modifications in the mid and 
long-term. In the case of Thames Water, it can be expected that the private company 
will continue to challenge the dispositions set by the environmental and economic 
regulators, especially their opposition to new reservoir building, the stricter price control 
mechanisms, and the tighter leakage targets. The contradictions arising from this process 
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may foster the chances for institutional reorganisation, like in the cases of Yorkshire 
Water and Welsh Water. Also, the current trend towards transnationalisation of the 
water sector is likely to continue, especially the acquisition of UK water companies by 
foreign investors. Thames Water itself has been acquired, in October 2000, by the 
German multi-utility RWE, and this may also have important consequences for the 
organisational landscape of the UK water sector in the mid and long-terms.   
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